MEINERS v. BERING STRAIT SCHOOL
DISTRICT AND THE RECALL OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS: A PROPOSAL
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
W. RICHARD
I.

FossEY*

INTRODUCTION

Recall is a process whereby voters remove an elected official
before his term of office expires. In Alaska, public officials may be
recalled from office for incompetence, misconduct, or failure to perform prescribed duties.' Persons dissatisfied with a public official's
performance may circulate a petition setting forth the reasons for recall, and if the
requisite number of signatures is obtained, a recall elec2
tion is held.
In Meiners v. Bering Strait School District,3 the Alaska Supreme

Court interpreted Alaska's municipal recall statute for the first time.
The supreme court ruled that statutes governing the recall of public
officials should be liberally construed to permit "the people . . . to
vote and express their will."' 4 Moreover, the supreme court stated that

factual disputes in recall petitions should not be resolved by election
officials. Rather, the public should decide the truth of the allegations
against the public official in a recall election.5 Finally, the supreme
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1. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.140 (1984).
2. Id. § 29.28.200.
3. 687 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1984).
4. Meiners v. Bering Strait School Dist., 687 P.2d 287, 296 (Alaska 1984) (citing
Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)). The recall of local public
officials is governed by Alaska Statutes sections 29.28.130-.250 (1984). The law pertaining to the recall of state officers is set forth in Alaska Statutes sections 15.45.470.720 (1982). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the recall statutes pertain to
those statutes set forth in Alaska Statutes sections 29.28.130-.250 (1984).
5. 687 P.2d at 300 n.18.
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court in Meiners ruled that a recall election should be held even if only
one of the allegations in the recall petition states a statutory ground
for recall. Election officials may delete an allegation that fails to state
a proper ground for recall, but the fact that some allegations are 6statutorily deficient will not be sufficient cause to reject the petition.
This article begins by reviewing the political development of the
recall device since its inception in the early twentieth century. Next,
the article outlines Alaska's recall process as it is set out in the state
constitution and statutes and as it has been interpreted by the Alaska
Supreme Court in Meiners. Third, the article identifies and discusses
recurring problems with the recall of public officials which have arisen
in other states. Specifically, public officials are sometimes forced to
defend themselves against recall drives based on false allegations or on
motives unrelated to the allegations stated in a recall petition. To the
extent that recall is used to punish those who make legitimate but unpopular decisions, it inhibits incumbent officials' freedom of action and
discourages qualified individuals from seeking public office. Finally,
the article concludes by proposing specific statutory amendments
designed to preserve the positive aspects of the recall process while
curbing potential abuses.
II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RECALL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES

The right of the electorate to recall public officials while they are
still in office is a relatively new political idea in the United States. The
concept was first espoused in the early twentieth century during the
progressive movement, which advocated political reforms of local and
state government. Like the initiative and the referendum, 7 recall reflects the progressive philosophy that voters should have power to bypass or countermand elected officials.
Although some municipalities already had incorporated recall
provisions into their charters by the early 1900's, Oregon in 1908 became the first state to place a recall provision in its constitution.8 Oregon was soon followed by Washington, 9 California,' 0 and Nevada."'
By 1927, twelve states, most of them in the West, had constitutional
6. Id. at 302-03.
7. Alaska's current Initiative and Referendum statutes are found at Alaska Statutes sections 29.28.060-.110 (1984).
8. The first recall provision in the United States was adopted by charter in Los
Angeles in 1903. Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Recall of Public Officers: Discretionary
Acts CannotBe Sufficient Basisfor Recall - State ex rel. CitizensAgainst Mandatory
Bussing v. Brooks, 48 WAsH. L. REv. 503, 505 n.6 (1973).
9. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34.
10. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1911, amended 1976).
11. NEv. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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recall provisions. 12 Other states, such as Minnesota 13 and South Dakota, 14 provided for recall by statute rather than by constitutional
amendment.
Arizona's experience reflects the popularity of recall in the early
twentieth century. In 1910, Arizona Territory convened a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a state constitution. Progressive politics dominated the convention, which adopted numerous
progressive ideas, including the initiative, the referendum, and a constitutional recall provision that permitted judges, as well as other public officials, to be recalled from office. The adoption of the recall
provision led President Taft to warn the convention delegates against
creating a "crank constitution." President Taft threatened to veto
Arizona's admission to the Union unless the provision for the recall of
judges was deleted from the constitution. 15 Congress passed a resolution in 1911 requiring the Arizona Territory, as a condition for statehood, to exempt the judiciary from its constitutional recall provision. 16
Arizona capitulated, and the constitutional recall provision was
amended to exclude the judiciary. Nevertheless, after Arizona was admitted to the Union, the legislature amended the constitution, reinserting a provision allowing recall of judges.' 7
Several recent developments demonstrate the continuing popularity of recall. In 1973, New Mexico passed a constitutional amendment
for the exclusive purpose of authorizing the recall of local school
board members.1 8 Kansas revised its recall provisions in 1976.19
Georgia voters ratified a constitutional amendment in 1978, allowing
12. ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-6; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art.
XXI, § 1; IDAHO CONsT. art. VI, § 6; KAN. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 3-5; LA. CONST. art.
IX, § 9; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; NEv. CONsT. art. II, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. III,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. II, § 18; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34; Wis. CONsT. art. XIII,

§ 12.
13. 1909 Minn. Laws 170, § 5 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 410.20 (West
1958 & Supp. 1984)).
14. 1913 S.D. Sess. Laws 119, § 15 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 913-29 to -35 (1981 & Supp. 1984)).
15. H. LAMAR, THE FAR SOUTHWEST 1846-1912, A TERRITORIAL HISTORY 503
(1970).
16. Act of Aug. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 42.
17. H. LAMAR, supra note 15, at 504. Some states, such as Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, and Washington, specifically exempt judges from the threat
of recall. Fordham, The Utah Recall Proposal, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 29, 35 n.28.
Other states, including California, Colorado, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, do not exclude the judiciary from recall. Id. at 35 n.27.
18. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 14.
19. 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws 178, § 31 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4301 to 4331 (1981)).
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the Georgia General Assembly to enact comprehensive recall
20

procedures.
Although recall provisions vary widely from state to state, all recall provisions employ the same three-part process. First, voters seeking to recall a public officer must circulate a recall petition. Second,
election officials must review the petition to determine whether it is
legally sufficient and whether it contains the requisite number of signa-

tures. Third, if election officials determine that the petition meets
these requirements, a recall election is held to determine whether the

public official should retain his office.
In general, recall provisions fall into two categories. 2 1 Recall provisions in the first category place no specific restrictions on the
grounds for a recall vote, so that an official may be recalled for virtu-

ally any reason. Thus, recall is strictly a political process, allowing the
electorate to dismiss in mid-term a public officer whose policies are

sufficiently unpopular to inspire a recall vote. 22 California, for exam-

ple, adopted this approach in a constitutional provision which states
23
that the sufficiency of reason for recall is not reviewable.

Recall provisions that fall into the second category specify that a
public official can be recalled only for misconduct in office. For exam-

ple, Washington's constitution permits voters to recall a public official
for misfeasance or malfeasance during office, or for violation of the
oath of office. 24 New Mexico's constitution applies the same standards

20. See GA. CONsT. art. II, § 2, 1 4 (1976); GA. CODE § 21-4-2 (1982).
21. Some states do not have recall statutes but permit public officers to be impeached or judicially removed from office through civil actions or criminal proceedings. Oklahoma, for example, permits public officials to be removed by all three
means. See L'Acquarius v. Hampton, 642 P.2d 1143 (Okla. 1982); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, §§ 1181-97 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 91-105 (1971). In general, public officials may not be removed by judicial proceedings except for statutorily defined misconduct.
In Iowa, the courts may remove an elected or appointed officer for six reasons:
(1) wilful or habitual neglect or refusal to perform duties of office; (2) wilful misconduct or maladministration in office; (3) corruption; (4) extortion; (5) conviction of a
felony; or (6) intoxication or conviction of intoxication. IOWA CODE ANN. § 66.1
(West 1973).
A public official opposing judicial removal is generally afforded the same protection as any civil defendant. For example, Oklahoma requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence in removal actions. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 105 (West
1962). Moreover, either the state or the public official may demand a jury trial.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 103 (West 1962).
22. See Abbey v. Green, 28 Ariz. 53, 235 P. 150 (1925); Wallace v. Tripp, 358
Mich. 668, 101 N.W.2d 312 (1960); Westpy v. Burnett, 82 N.J. Super. 239, 97 A.2d
400 (1964).
23. CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 14(a).
24. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 33.
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to the recall of school board members.2 5 A Florida statute authorizes
26
a recall election for seven specific forms of misconduct.
The distinction between systems allowing recall for any reason
and those specifying acceptable grounds for recall tends to become
blurred in practice. Courts often have construed constitutional and
statutory recall provisions very broadly in order to permit voters to
decide whether a public officer should be permitted to remain in office.
For example, Washington courts broadly construed "misfeasance or
malfeasance" 27 to include "any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts or interferes with the performance of official duty;" and interpreted "violation of an official's oath of office" to include any failure to
perform official duties honestly, faithfully, and to the best of the officer's ability. 28 The Washington courts repeatedly ruled that the voters, not the courts, are to determine whether allegations in a recall
petition are true.2 9 A Florida court took the same view in refusing to
review the truth or falsity of recall allegations. 30 A Kansas statute
which limits recall grounds to the conviction of a felony, incompetence, or failure to perform duties prescribed by law 31 has an explicit
provision for liberal construction. The provision states that "[n]o recall submitted to the voters
shall be held void because of the insuffi'32
ciency of the grounds.
Montana does not follow the majority rule of liberally construing
recall provisions to permit a recall vote. Instead, Montana's Recall
Act provides that "[p]hysical or mental lack of fitness, incompetence,
violation of [the official's] oath of office, official misconduct, or conviction of a felony offense enumerated in Title 45 is the only basis for
recall."' 33 Moreover, under Montana law, a public official may not be
recalled for performing a mandatory official duty or for failing to take
an action that, if performed, would subject him to prosecution for official misconduct. 34 The Montana Supreme Court has stated that recall
25. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 14.
26. FLA. STAT. § 100.361(b) (1982) permits a municipal official to be recalled for
malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, and conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude.
27. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (Supp. 1984).
28. Danielson v. Faymonville, 72 Wash. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963, 966-67 (1967).
But see Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984), in which the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the discretionary acts of school board members did
not provide grounds for recall and overruled Danielson v. Faymonville to the extent it
is inconsistent.
29. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lamon v. Westport, 73 Wash. 2d 255, 438 P.2d 200
(1968), overruledon other groundsin Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799
(1984); Skidmore v. Fuller, 59 Wash. 2d 818, 370 P.2d 975 (1962).
30. See Bent v. Ballantyne, 368 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979).
31.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4302 (1981).

32. Id.
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-603(3) (1983) (emphasis added).
34. Id.
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is a "special, extraordinary, and unusual proceeding," and a "harsh
remedy. ' ' 35 According to the Montana court, the statutory limitations
contained in the Montana Recall Act 36 express
a clear intent that the
37
recall procedure not be lightly undertaken.
In all states having recall statutes, a petition signed by the requisite number of dissatisfied voters must be presented to the appropriate
election official before the recall process may proceed. Signature requirements vary widely. For example, in Washington, recall petitions
for most public officials must contain signatures equal to twenty-five
percent of the votes cast for all candidates who ran for the targeted
official's office. The signature requirement is increased to thirty-five
percent for certain local officials. 3 8 In North Dakota, a recall petition
must be signed by at least twenty-five percent of the number of voters
in the last gubernatorial election in the district from which the public
officer is to be recalled. 39 To recall a state officer in Georgia, the
number of signatures must equal at least fifteen percent of the registered voters at the last general election for the office held by the
targeted officer. 40 Moreover, at least one-fifteenth of the necessary signatures must come from each congressional district in the state. The
41
signature requirement is increased to thirty percent for local officials.
The number of signatures required can significantly affect the frequency of recall elections. In states that base the signature requirement on the number of people who voted in a given election, a light
voter turnout allows a recall petition to be obtained with relatively few
signatures. On the other hand, states which base signature requirements for recall on the number of votes for governor in the official's
district generally require more signatures, because, as a rule, more
people vote in gubernatorial than in strictly local elections. 42 States
basing the signature requirement on the number of registered voters
have the most strict signature requirements because the number of registered voters is usually much higher than the number of actual voters
43
in any election.
35. State ex rel. Palmer v. Hart, 655 P.2d 965, 967 (Mont. 1982).
36. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-601 to -635 (1983).
37. 655 P.2d at 968; see also Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash. 2d 268, 693 P.2d 71
(1984) and Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984), in which the
Washington Supreme Court retreated from prior decisions which liberally construed
Washington's constitutional recall provision, and expressed concern that the recall
process not be used to harass public officials. See infra text accompanying notes 14166.
38. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.060 (1965).
39. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 10.
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-4(a)(1) (1982).

41. Id. § 21-4-4 (a)(2).
42. See Meiners, 687 P.2d at 297 n.9.
43. For example, fewer than twenty-five percent of the registered voters in the
Matanuska-Susitna Borough voted in the school board election held on October 2,
1984. See infra note 174.
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In summary, the distinction between various recall provisions is
illusory: most state courts are reluctant to void a recall petition on the
ground that it fails to state statutory grounds for recall. If a recall
petition is found to be valid on its face, most courts will not scrutinize
it. Instead, they will let the matter be decided by the voters. Even
narrow statutory grounds for recall are often construed liberally to
permit the voters, rather than the courts, to decide whether a public
officer should remain in office. The frequency of recall elections, however, is largely a function of the number of signatures required on recall petitions.
III.
A.

RECALL IN ALASKA

Legislative History

Alaska passed its first recall statute in 1949, while it was still a
territory. Before that time, voters could bring removal proceedings
against Alaska municipal officers in the territorial district court. The
statutory grounds for removal were malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. 44 Elective recall was established by a statute, 45 which, like
the earlier removal provision, specified malfeasance, misfeasance, or
nonfeasance as the permissible grounds for recall. The recall ballot
was to include the reason or reasons for recall, and petitioners were
required to swear the allegations were true to the best of their knowledge and belief. A sixty-five percent majority was needed for successful recall. 46 In 1955, the territorial legislature reduced the required
percentage to a simple majority. 47
At the Alaska constitutional convention, the delegates debated
the merits of a proposed recall provision which specified four grounds
for recall: malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. 48 The convention voted to delete the
specific grounds from the constitutional provision and then considered
whether even the legislature should have the power to limit the
grounds for recall of public officers. 49 Opposing any legislative power
44. See ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 16-1-61 (1949) (cited in Meiners v. Bering
Strait School Dist., 687 P.2d 287, 294 (Alaska 1984)). "Removal" refers to the process whereby public officials are dismissed from office in mid-term by court action
rather than by a popular election. For a brief discussion of the removal processes in
Iowa and Oklahoma, see supra note 21.
45. 1949 Alaska Sess. Laws 90 (cited in Meiners, 687 P.2d at 294).
46. Id.
47. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 294 (citing 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 126).
48. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1237-39
(January 5, 1956) (cited in Meiners, 687 P.2d at 295).
49. Id.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:41

of limitation, Delegate White argued that "[t]he vital part of the recall
movement ... is that the people retain not only the right to recall a
public official but to name the reasons for instituting such action and
let the action itself stand or fall on the merits of the case." 50 Delegate
Hurley argued in favor of the legislative power:
I think it is fair to leave it to the legislature to prescribe the grounds
under which a recall petition should be circulated so as to prevent
circulation of recall petitions for petty grounds in local jurisdictions
by some recalcitrant officer who was not elected, which I have seen
happen in my own community. 5 1
The latter view ultimately prevailed. Article XI, section 8 of the
Alaska Constitution, unchanged since statehood, states:
Recall. [A]ll elected public officials in the State, except judicial officers, are subject to recall by the voters of the State or political
subdivision from which elected. Procedures and grounds for recall
shall be prescribed by the legislature.
In 1959, the state legislature passed a recall statute that appeared
to follow Delegate White's view that a public official should be subject
to recall for any reason chosen by the voters. Although the statute
specified narrow grounds for recall, they were rendered meaningless
by a statutory provision stating that any insufficiency in the statement
of grounds shall not affect the validity of the proceedings or the elecof grounds was "intended solely for the information. The statement' '52
tion of the electors.
In 1972, the legislature enacted the current recall statute, which
has more stringent requirements for recall. The statute limits the permissible grounds for recall to misconduct in office, incompetence, or
failure to perform prescribed duties. 53 The recall petition must now
contain a statement of grounds detailing specific instances of the alleged misconduct. 54 The current statute no longer provides that the
sole purpose of the statement of grounds is to provide information.
These changes reflect a movement away from recall at will toward
recall only in more specifically defined situations.
Under Alaska's current statutes, a recall petition in an area with
fewer than 7,500 residents must be signed by a number of registered
voters equal to at least twenty-five percent of the total number of votes
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. 1959 Alaska Sess. Laws 121, §§ 2-4 (cited in Meiners, 687 P.2d at 295). ComALASKA STAT. § 15.45.710 (1982) (pertaining to the recall of the
Alaska governor, lieutenant governor, or state legislators; it states: "No recall submitted to the voters shall be held void because of the insufficiency of the grounds, application, or petition by which the submission was procured.").
53. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.140 (1984).
54. Id. § 29.28.150(a)(3).

pare id. with
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cast at the last general election. In areas with more than 7,500 residents, the required percentage is reduced to fifteen.5 5 The petition
must be filed with the appropriate election official within sixty days
after the date of the earliest signature, and it must contain "a statement of the grounds of the recall stated with particularity as to specific
instances. '5 6 Within ten days of the petition's filing, the election official must review the sufficiency of the petition's content and determine
whether the signature requirement has been met. If the number of
signatures is insufficient, the sponsors may supplement the petition
57
with additional signatures within ten days of the petition's rejection.
If the petition is insufficient for any other reason, it is rejected and filed
58
as a public record.
If a recall petition is determined to be valid and no regular election is scheduled within seventy-five days, the appropriate election official is directed to hold a special recall election within that period.5 9 In
a recall election, the ballot must contain the specific grounds stated in
the recall petition, as well as any rebuttal of up to 200 words submitted
by the targeted official. If the recall election fails, another recall petition may not be filed against the same official for six months. 60 In the
event a public officer is recalled, another election is held to select his
61
successor.
B. Meiners v. Bering Strait School District: The Alaska Supreme
Court Interprets the Recall Statute
The Alaska Supreme Court first interpreted Alaska's municipal
recall statute in Meiners v. Bering Strait School District.62 Meiners
involved an effort to recall the eleven school board members of the
Bering Strait School District, a Regional Education Attendance Area
(REAA)63 located in Northwest Alaska.
55. Id. §§ 29.28.150(a)(l)-.170(b).
56. Id. § 29.28.150(a)(3).
57. Id. §§ 29.28.160-.170(a).
58. Id. Petitions to recall municipal officials, including municipal school board
members, are filed with the municipal clerk. Id. § 29.28.150. Petitions to recall
school board members of Regional Education Attendance Areas are filed with the
Alaska Division of Elections, which performs the functions of a municipal clerk in
recall matters. Id. § 14.08.081 (1982).
59. Id. § 29.28.200(b) (1984).
60. Id. §§ 29.28.210-.240.
61. Id. § 29.28.250.
62. 687 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1984).
63. Id. at 291-92. REAAs were formed in 1976 to provide for local management
of education in the unorganized boroughs and military reservations of Alaska.
ALASKA STAT. § 14.08.011 (1982).
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1. Elements of the Dispute in Meiners. The recall petition contained three paragraphs. Paragraph one charged the school board
with "failure to control the administrative practices of [the] superintendent." 64 Paragraph two of the petition accused the board of "failure. . . to provide full and open communication" with voters of the
district and of failure to give adequate notice of school board meetings. 65 In addition, paragraph two charged the board with failure to
disclose adequate school board minutes. 66 Paragraph three accused
the board of failure to respond to allegations of conflict of interest. 67
Under Alaska law, recall petitions against regional school board
members are submitted to the Alaska Division of Elections, which
performs the same function as the municipal clerk in local recall matters. 68 In Meiners, the Division verified 249 signatures on the recall
petition and determined that only 198 were necessary to meet the statutory requirements, 69 based on the number of votes cast at the last
regular school board election. 70 With the assistance of the Alaska Attorney General's office, the Division rewrote the recall petition to correct perceived problems with the petition's language and statements of
71
law.
Acting on behalf of the targeted school board members, the
School District sued the Division of Elections, seeking to enjoin the
recall election. The District claimed that the conduct alleged in the
recall petition did not come within the statutory grounds for recall.
The District also argued that the number of signatures was insufficient
and that the Division of Elections erred in using language in the recall
ballot that differed from the language in the recall petition. 72 Subsequently, the Division of Elections reconsidered its decision to modify
the language of the recall petition and decided that the text of the
charges on the ballot should be exactly as stated in the recall
73
petition.
The superior court granted summary judgment for the School
District and enjoined the recall election. The court ruled that the Director of Elections had misinterpreted the statute that specifies the
number of signatures required. 74 According to the superior court, the
64. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 291-92.
65. Id. at 292.

66. Id.

67. Id.
68. ALAsKA

STAT.

§ 14.08.081 (1982).

69. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 292.
70. Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id (discussing ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.070(b) (1984)).
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"last general election," which determines the number of signatures required, meant the last election for statewide officers held in November
1982, not the last regular election of school board members held in
October 1982. More votes were cast in the district in the statewide
election than in the school board election; thus, the 249 signatures obtained were less 75than the required twenty-five percent of the appropriate, larger vote.
Although the superior court found the signature issue to be dispositive, it commented on other issues as well. First, the court stated
that the Division of Elections could not edit the language of the recall
petition when preparing recall ballots; the language on the ballot must
be identical to the statement of recall grounds contained in the recall
petition. 76 In addition, the court indicated, without deciding, that the
and three of the recall petiallegations contained in paragraphs one
77
tions did not state grounds for recall.
After the superior court enjoined the recall in Meiners, recall proponents gathered sufficient additional signatures within the prescribed
ten-day period to surpass twenty-five percent of the number of votes in
the November 1982 general election. 78 The Division of Elections certified as adequate the petition with the additional signatures and
scheduled a recall election. Acting on the advice of the Alaska Attorney General's Office, the Division concluded that paragraph three of
statutory grounds for recall and omitthe recall petition did not state
79
ballot.
recall
the
ted it from
The School District again sought to enjoin the recall election.
The District argued that paragraphs one and two failed to state
grounds for recall. In addition, the District argued that once the Division of Elections found that any portion of a petition failed to state
statutory grounds for recall it was required to reject the entire petition,
rather than merely delete the insufficient grounds from the recall
ballot.8 0
The superior court's ruling on the new petition was largely
favorable to the School Board's position. The court held that
paragraphs one and three of the recall petition did not state statutory
81
grounds for recall and that paragraph two was partially insufficient.
The court further ruled that a recall petition must be placed on the
ballot in its entirety. Since some of the allegations in the recall
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.170(a) (1984).

79. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 293.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 294.
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petition failed to state grounds for recall, no election could be held on
that petition.8 2 3The Division of Elections appealed the superior
8
court's decision.
2. The Supreme Court's Analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by concluding that the recall statute should be liberally
construed to permit recall petitions to go before the voters:
[W]e conclude that statutes relating to the recall, like those relating
to the initiative and referendum, "should be liberally construed so
that 'the people [are] permitted to vote and express their will
.... '" Like the initiative and referendum, the recall process is
fundamentally a part of the political process. The purposes of recall
are therefore not well served if artificial technical hurdles are unnecessarily3 created
by the judiciary as parts of the process prescribed by
4
statute.
The supreme court then noted that each issue before the court
arose because of the recall statute's ambiguity. Less judicial participation would be necessary, the court observed, if the recall statute were
more carefully drawn.85 The Alaska Constitution directs the legislature to prescribe the grounds and procedures for recall. Thus, the legislature, not the courts, should "strike the balances" necessary to carry
out the constitutional command that elected officers be subject to
86
recall.
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the supreme court began by
interpreting the statute that fixes signature requirements for recall petitions based on the "total number of votes cast at the last general
election in the [jurisdiction] concerned, or special election called for
the purpose of electing city or borough officers." 87T The superior court
had ruled that "general election" in this context was synonymous with
"general election" as defined in Title 15 of the Alaska Code dealing
with state elections: the statewide election "held on the Tuesday after
the first Monday in November of even-numbered years."8 8 The Division of Elections contended instead that "general election" for the purposes of the recall statute meant the regular municipal election held
82. Id. The school district argued that the statutory ten-day period for gathering
additional signatures did not follow a judicial - as opposed to an administrative decision that the petition had insufficient signatures. The superior court rejected this
argument. Id at 293.
83. The superior court certified a partial judgment for immediate appeal under
Alaska Civil Rule 54(b). Id. at 294.
84. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.070(b) (1984).
88. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 297 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(a) (1982)).
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annually on the first Tuesday in October of each year.89 Since more
people had voted in the previous statewide general election than in the
previous regular municipal (or, more properly, REAA school board)
election, the superior court's definition of "general election" required
more signatures on the recall petition than the definition endorsed by
the Division of Elections.
In support of its interpretation, the Division of Elections argued
that because a recall election is itself a local election it is logical to
assume that signature requirements on a recall petition should be
based on the last local election, not the last statewide election. 90
Moreover, the Division pointed out instances in Title 29, which contains municipal election statutes, in which the legislature had used
"general election" in contexts suggesting that it meant "regular municipal election." 9 1
Persuaded by the arguments of the Division of Elections, the
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the legislature had inadvertently
used the term "general election" to define recall signature requirements when it meant "regular municipal election." Therefore, the
requisite number of signatures was twenty-five percent of the number
the
of votes cast in the last regular municipal election. Accordingly,
92
original petition contained the necessary number of signatures.
The court next considered the School District's argument that the
recall petition failed to state any of the statutory recall grounds of
"misconduct in office, incompetence or failure to perform prescribed
duties." '93 The petition charged the school board 94 first, with failure to
control its superintendent (alleging specific examples of inappropriate
conduct by the superintendent), and second, with failure to provide
full and open communication between the board and voters of the district, in violation of the state's open meetings9 5 and public records
laws. 96 The School District argued that none of the allegations in the
89. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.020 (1984)).
90. Id. The argument advanced by the Division of Elections is not particularly
persuasive in light of the fact that other jurisdictions specifically base signature requirements for local recall elections on the number of votes cast in the jurisdiction
during the last gubernatorial election. See MICH. COMp. LAWS § 168.955 (1967); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 9-13-30 (1981).
91. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 297.
92. Id. at 298.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.140 (1984).
94. The original recall petition contained three paragraphs. The sufficiency of
paragraph three was not at issue before the supreme court because the Division of
Elections had already conceded that it did not state statutory grounds for recall. See
Meiners, 687 P.2d at 298 n.13.
95. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1984). The petition did not make reference to
any specific statute.
96. Id. §§ 09.25.110-.120 (1983).
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petition stated a failure to comply with the Board's statutory duties
and powers. In the District's view, although the school board has a
duty to employ a superintendent, the decision to control the superintendent is a discretionary power. Thus, an allegation that the school
board failed to control the superintendent would not amount to a
97
charge that the school board had failed to perform a statutory duty.
The supreme court rejected the District's narrow interpretation of
the school board's duties. The court construed the school board's
duty to employ a superintendent to include the duty to supervise.
Thus, a charge that the board failed to supervise the superintendent
adequately was sufficient to charge the board with failure to perform
its duty.98 The court held that school board members had a duty to
comply with statutes of general application relating to education.
"When the board undertakes to exercise one of its powers specified in
section 101," the court stated, "it must do so in accordance with the
law, even though it had no obligation to exercise that particular power
at all." 99 Therefore, the board's failure to exercise its power in a lawful manner could constitute a failure to perform a duty prescribed by a
statute of general application.'00
The supreme court also ruled against the District on the second
charge contained in the recall petition. The court held that the allegation that the school board had violated the state's public records' 0 1
and open meetings laws 0 2 fell within the statutory ground of failure to
perform a prescribed duty.103
Finally, the supreme court reviewed the lower court's holding
that if any individual charge on a recall petition is insufficient election
officials must reject the entire petition. The court reversed the lower
court and ruled that the certifying election officer should delete statutorily deficient charges and place charges that are sufficient under the
recall statutes on the ballot in full and without revision. 1' 4 The
supreme court believed rejection of a partially insufficient recall petition would frustrate the purpose of the recall statute. In many cases,
the court reasoned, petitions are prepared without the assistance of
counsel and may be attacked by the targeted public officials' attorneys.
If a recall petition were rejected for partial insufficiency, the recall proponents' only recourse would be to begin again the process of circulat97. Compare

ALASKA

STAT.

§ 14.08.111(3) (1982) with

§ 14.08.101(4) (1982).
98. Id. at 300.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.110-.120 (1983).

102. Id. § 44.62.310 (1984).
103. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 301.
104. Id. at 303.

ALASKA

STAT.
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ing a petition, with no assurance that the new petition would
withstand different objections. 105 In the court's view, the signature requirement itself requires a substantial commitment of resources which
should not be disregarded because a portion of the petition is
deficient. 106
3. Implicationsof the Meiners Decisionfor Future Recall Efforts in
Alaska. In addition to deciding the specific issues before it, the
supreme court in Meiners enunciated several guidelines for election
officials evaluating future recall petitions. First, the court expressed a
strong reluctance to reject a recall petition for merely technical deficiencies. 10 7 Second, the court indicated that the language of the allegations set forth in the recall ballot should be identical to the
corresponding language in the recall petition. Recall election officials
should not edit or revise the language of a recall petition in any way
when placing recall charges on the ballot. 10 8 Third, a recall petition is
not fatally defective solely because it contains dubious characterizations of the law. Unless a petition alleges violation of a fictitious law,
"[i]t is not the place of [election officials] to decide legal questions of
this kind."' 0 9
Finally, the Meiners decision places Alaska among those jurisdictions which hold that deciding the truth or falsity of recall charges is a
matter for the voters, not the election officials. The School District
argued that the recall petition should be invalidated because it stated
as fact that the Department of Education had ruled that the funds
were spent in an inappropriate manner. According to the court, this
statement did not provide a basis for rejecting the petition:
This is a statement of fact. If it is not true, the board members may
say so in their rebuttals. Similarly, if they believe that it is a mischaracterization of what the Department of Education actually did,
or if they think that there are circumstances in mitigation which
should have caused the Department to refrain from making such a
judgment, it is open to the board members to make their positions
known by way of rebuttal. Again, it is the responsibility of the voters to make their decision in light of the charges and rebuttals. It is
not the role of the municipal clerk or Director of Elections to take
the matter out of the voters' hands. 110
In summary, the Meiners court liberally construed Alaska's recall
statute so that "the people [are] permitted to vote and express their
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

302-03.
303.
296, 301.
303.
301.
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will." 11' 1 In the court's view, the purpose of recall would be thwarted
if technicalities and "legal straight jackets" were permitted to thwart
the recall process.112 The court broadly construed the.grounds for recall and indicated that the truth or falsity of charges should be decided
by the voters. In many respects, Meiners is in harmony with decisions
in other states, particularly the earlier Washington cases that liberally
construed recall statutes.1 1 3 Nevertheless, in taking this view the
Alaska Supreme Court failed to consider the potential for abuse that
exists when the availability of recall is not balanced with the legitimate
interests of public officials and the public's interest in the unobstructed
performance of legitimate activities by public officials.
Perhaps the Meiners opinion did not recognize the potential for
abuse of the recall statute because the facts of the Meiners case did not
suggest that the recall statute had been misused. Nevertheless, as will
be discussed in the next section, abuse of the recall process is a recurring problem in every jurisdiction that permits recall.
One area of potential abuse, which was absent and hence not considered in Meiners, is the use of inflammatory or false allegations to
gain signatures in recall drives. Such tactics may induce some voters
to sign a recall petition containing allegations that fail to state proper
grounds for recall. The Meiners remedy of deleting such allegations
after the voters have signed is inadequate from the targeted official's
viewpoint, because there is no way of knowing whether the necessary
number of signatures would have been obtained without the objectionable allegations.
One Alaska court considering this problem prior to Meiners
threw out the entire recall petition because one allegation failed to
state a ground for recall under Alaska law. In Siry v. MatanuskaSusitna Borough,1 1 4 the superior court ruled that not only was the allegation statutorily deficient, but it was also inflammatory and capable
of inciting persons to sign a recall petition who otherwise might not
sign. In the superior court's view, the inflammatory allegation "infest[ed] the whole process with illegitimacy," and for that reason the
5
entire petition was rejected."
Although the approach employed in Siry has now been foreclosed
by the supreme court's decision in Meiners, the potential for similar
111. Id. at 296 (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)).
112. Id. at 296, 301.
113. See infra discussion accompanying notes 125-32. Even the Washington
Supreme Court, however, has recently retreated from its most expansive recall decisions in recognition of the countervailing need to protect public officials from abuse of
the recall process. See infra text accompanying notes 143-66.
114. No. 3 PA-84-426 (Alaska Super. Ct. May 23, 1984) (oral opinion on motion
for preliminary injunction).
115. Id. transcript at 8-9.
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abuses of the recall process remains. The following sections discuss
further the problems with Alaska's recall process remaining after
Meiners and propose additional measures designed to allow continued
access to the recall process while minimizing abuse.

IV.

RECURRING PROBLEMS WITH THE RECALL PROCESS

The popularity of recall reflects the continuing appeal of its underlying policy favoring electoral removal of public officials who displease a majority of the electorate. Nevertheless, inherent in the recall
process are two serious recurring problems: the possibility of false allegations in the recall petition and potential inhibition of discretionary
political decisionmaking.
A.

False Allegations

Courts are generally unsympathetic to suits by public officials
seeking to enjoin recall elections on the ground that the allegations
against them are false. In Washington, the courts have stated repeatedly that the voters, not the courts, shall determine the truth of allegations contained in recall petitions.1 16 The Alaska Supreme Court also
117
has adopted this view.
The courts' rationale for refusing to rule on the truth of allegations in recall petitions is that recall is a political process which should
not be impeded by judicial intervention. The political process is weakened, however, when public officials are subjected to recall on the basis
of false allegations; public confidence in the electoral process is undermined and cynicism is generated about the political process in general.
As one Washington commentator has noted, permitting recall proponents to place false allegations on recall ballots is nothing short of an
election fraud."18 During a general election, an official's opponents
may not put false allegations against the official on the ballot." 9 Yet,
this practice is permitted, in effect, in most jurisdictions if the false
allegation is placed on a recall ballot.
Alaska public officials who are subjected to recall based on false
allegations have no effective remedy. A targeted public official may
submit a two hundred-word rebuttal on the recall ballot, but this opportunity for rebuttal is not an adequate protection because it requires
116. See, e.g., Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984); Skidmore
v. Fuller, 59 Wash. 2d 818, 370 P.2d 975 (1962).
117. See Meiners, 687 P.2d at 300 n.18.
118. Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time for Reform, 50 WASH. L. Rnv. 29, 53
(1974).
119. Alaska's election statutes provide that a person who knowingly circulates
false campaign literature about a candidate commits a Class A misdemeanor. See
ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1982).
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the official to expend substantial time and resources defending his office with no assurance that voters will believe or even read the rebuttal.
A public official may bring a libel action against persons who circulate
false recall charges,12 0 but the broad privilege given to persons commenting on matters of public interest, particularly in Alaska, 2' renders a libel action ineffective in curbing this kind of abuse. In public
interest cases, false statements are not actionable unless they are made
with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their truth
or falsity. 122 Moreover, persons who initiate recall petitions in Alaska
are not required to identify themselves. Thus, a public official may not
know who is responsible for drafting the charges that may drive him
from office.
B.

Inhibition of Discretionary Action by Public Officials

A second serious problem inherent in the recall process is that the
threat of recall may inhibit public officials from making legitimate but
unpopular decisions for fear that the decisions will lead to premature
removal from office. Even if a public official were confident that he
would win a recall election, the expense involved in defending against
the recall charges may discourage him from making decisions that will
anger an active minority of his constituency.
The problem of inhibiting discretionary action is illustrated by
Siry v. Matanuska-SusitnaBorough,1 23 in which a school board member was targeted for recall in Alaska after participating in a controversial personnel decision. The superior court expressed concern that the
use of the recall statute to oust officials who make difficult decisions
would undermine representative government:
Mrs. Siry, like any other elected official, is called upon from time to
time to make unpopular decisions. . . . This is an area that we
have to be very careful about. We certainly don't want to discourage public officials, elected officials, from making those difficult decisions. You know, the United States has seen the Congress of this
country for many years, refuse to face many, many of the devisive
[sic] issues in the country. And the courts have increasingly had to
take that over. That is unfortunate because many of those issues,
indeed, should have been decided by elected representatives so they
could have received the approval or the disapproval of the electorate at the elections held every two or four years and we should not
120. State v. Wilson, 137 Wash. 125, 241 P. 970 (1925); see Annot., 43 A.L.R.
1268 (1926).
121. See Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711, 714 (Alaska 1966)
(holding privilege of public discussion to include even factual misstatements so long as
the misstatements are not malicious).
122. Id. at 715.
123. No. 3 PA-84-426 (Alaska Super. Ct. May 23, 1984) (oral opinion on motion
for preliminary injunction).
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allow ourselves to begin using the recall petition device for the purpose of giving people the heave-ho just because they've taken a
stand on a difficult public issue. Furthermore, we have to recognize
that many people that are brought before the electorate on a recall
petition win, and what happens is that a person gets subjected to a
recall petition because they have taken a position on a difficult public issue, then they are put to the burden of either giving up their
public office, or of spending substantial campaign monies to keep
the office. This is not the purpose of the recall statutes at all. The
purpose is to weed people out of public office whose conduct falls
within very narrowly defined standards of impropriety or
insufficiency. 124
The potential for misuse of recall in reaction to officials' unpopular discretionary decisions can also be seen in a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. For example, in
Danielson v. Faymonville,125 a public utility commissioner was
targeted for recall after he allegedly circulated petitions to establish an
independent water district. Recall proponents charged that the commissioner's conduct conflicted with his duty to operate the existing
public water system. 126 The Danielson court127upheld the validity of the
recall and allowed the election to proceed.
12 8
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court in Bocek v. Bayley
upheld a petition alleging that a school board hired an unqualified superintendent and failed to bargain in good faith, without inquiring into
the motives of the recall petitioners or addressing itself to the possibility that the recall process was used to oust a public official for unpopular discretionary acts.
129
In State ex reL Citizens against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks,
the Seattle school board was faced with recall after instigating a
mandatory school busing plan for the purpose of racial desegregation.
Recall petitioners did not directly challenge the adoption of the busing
plan. Rather, the recall petition accused the board members of malfeasance, misfeasance, and violation of their oaths of office based on a
number of allegations, some of which related to the busing program.
In addition, other recall charges were made against school board
members that did not relate to the busing plan. These charges included the allegation that the school board had hired an unqualified
officially imposed segregation by race within
superintendent and13had
0
the school district.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. transcript at 8.
72 Wash. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967).
Id. at 855-56, 435 P.2d at 964.
Id. at 860, 435 P.2d at 967.
81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973).
80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
Id. at 125-27, 492 P.2d at 539-40.
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The Brooks court ruled that the charges directed against the
school board's busing plan failed to state grounds for recall under
Washington law because they alleged acts within the proper discretion
of the school board.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the allegations not directed toward the busing plan could
constitute grounds for recall and, therefore, a recall election could be
held. 132
The consequences for public officials who must face recall drives
motivated by dissatisfaction with their discretionary actions can be severe. An Alaska public official who makes a valid but unpopular decision may find himself charged with grave misconduct. He may be
forced to spend considerable amounts of time, energy, and money defending his office in mid-term as a result of a single unpopular decision. In such instances, recall undermines rather than enhances
representative government. Elected officials are inhibited from making the decisions for which they are responsible. The long-term effect
of such abuses may be to discourage civic-minded individuals from
participating in local government.
V.

A.

MOVING TOWARD REFORM OF THE RECALL PROCESS

The Washington Experience: New Legislative and Judicial
Controls

As noted earlier,1 33 the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Meiners was consistent with the Washington Supreme Court's liberal construction of Washington's recall statutes. Recent developments in
Washington law, however, demonstrate a strong movement toward a
more restrictive construction of Washington's recall statutes. Before
these developments, Washington's recall process and its liberal interpretation by the Washington courts had been criticized by several legal
commentators.13 4 As one writer commented, the recall device should
not serve to remove politically unpopular elected public officials or to
express disapproval of unpopular, but otherwise legal, actions of public officials. 135 Rather, "[u]se of the recall process should be limited
solely to removal of a wrongdoer from elective office."' 136 Legislative
reforms were proposed to accomplish this limited goal. The proposed
reforms would: (1) require recall sponsors to verify they have knowledge of the alleged facts upon which their recall petitions are based;
131. Id. at 128, 492 P.2d at 541-42.
132. Id. at 131-32, 492 P.2d at 542-43.
133. See supra text accompanying note 112.
134. See, eg., Cohen, supra note 118; Note, Sufficiency of Charges to Support a
Recall Election, 8 GONZ. L. Rav. 131 (1973).
135. Cohen, supra note 118, at 54.
136. Id. at 54-55.
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(2) establish narrowly defined grounds for recall; and (3) adopt a statutory provision giving the courts jurisdiction to review recall

charges. 137
In 1984, perhaps in response to criticism from legal commentators, or perhaps out of concern about the increasing number of recall
drives in Washington, 138 the Washington legislature enacted several
important changes in Washington's recall statute. The changes include the addition of a requirement that recall sponsors certify that
they have knowledge of the alleged facts upon which the recall charges
are based. 139 In addition, the specific grounds for recall, which were
already enumerated in the state constitution, were further defined.
For example, "violation of the oath of office" was defined to mean the
"wilful neglect or failure by an elective public officer to perform faithfully a duty imposed by law." 1' 4
Probably the most significant revision of Washington's recall law
was a 1984 statutory amendment that requires the recall charges and
the ballot synopsis of charges to be submitted to the superior court for
a determination of their legal sufficiency and adequacy. 14 1 The Washington legislature specifically granted jurisdiction to the superior court
over matters relating to the recall of local officials, and the supreme
court was given jurisdiction over the recall of state officers. 142
Since the passage of the 1984 legislative amendments, the Washington Supreme Court has issued two decisions that radically depart
from its prior decisions. The prior decisions construed Washington
law liberally to permit the voters to decide the truth or falsity of recall
allegations. In the companion cases of Cole v. Webster 143 and Chandler v. Otto, 144 the court retreated from precedents going back more
than seventy years 145 and expressed concern about the use of recall to
harass public officials or to remove public officials from office for unpopular discretionary actions.
In Cole, a recall petition was filed against all five members of a
school board, charging them with wasting taxes by voting to close
three schools. The school board members also were charged with
137. Id. at 43-54.
138. During the fifty years from 1913 until 1963, twenty recall petitions were filed
in Washington. From 1963 until 1974, thirty-seven petitions were fied. Cohen, supra
note 118, at 56.
139. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (Supp. 1984).

140. Id. § 29.82.010(2).
141. Id. §§ 29.82.021-.023.
142. Id. § 29.82.160.
143. 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984).
144. 103 Wash. 2d 268, 693 P.2d 71 (1984).
145. See e.g., Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913).
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retaining an incompetent superintendent 4 6 and with violating Washington's Open Meetings Act1 47 by improperly withholding minutes of
school board meetings from the public.
The Washington Supreme Court overruled four previous decisions 14 8 and held that the recall petition was not sufficient under
Washington law. In accordance with its earlier decision in State ex
rel. Citizens against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 149 the court ruled
that the school board's decision to close three public schools was a
discretionary act which did not form a valid basis for recall. The court
noted that the construction of new schools and the closing of old ones
are two of the most important functions of local school authorities 150
and stated that:
The board's decision clearly required judgment guided by knowledge, prudence and circumspection. In addition, the right to make

such a decision is essential to the board's satisfactory completion of
the responsibilities entrusted to the school districts by the Legisla-

ture and is necessary to the fulfillment
of the state's paramount duty
51
to provide for public education.'
Therefore, the court ruled that school board members could not be
recalled for closing a school unless they arbitrarily or unreasonably
exercised their discretion.
The court also ruled that allegations that the school board had
violated the state's Open Meetings Act should be dismissed as factually insufficient. The recall statute requires that the charges state sufficient facts to demonstrate to the voters, the targeted official, and the
election official that the acts or failure to act constitute a prima facie
showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. 1 52 The recall petition was found insufficient in this regard because
146. The allegation of retaining an incompetent superintendent had become a standard element in Washington recall petitions, as the Washington Supreme Court had
previously ruled on a number of recall petitions charging public officials with hiring
incompetent subordinates. See Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814
(1973); State ex reL Citizens against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121,
492 P.2d 536 (1972); State ex rel Lamon v. Westport, 73 Wash. 2d 255, 438 P.2d 200
(1968); Danielson v. Faymonville, 72 Wash. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967); Morton v.
McDonald, 41 Wash. 2d 889, 252 P.2d 577 (1953).
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.30.020-.920 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
148. Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973); State ex rel. Citizens
against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972); State ex
reL Lamon v. Westport, 73 Wash. 2d 255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968); Danielson v.
Faymonville, 72 Wash. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967).
149. 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
150. Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280,
692 P.2d 799, 802 (1984) (citing
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
151. Id.
-,

152. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 29.81.010 (Supp. 1984) states:

The charge shall state the act or acts complained of in concise language, give
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it did not state the time and place of the alleged illegal meeting. In the
Washington Supreme Court's view, the requirement that recall
charges be specific "is not a cumbersome burden when one considers
officials can be subjected if charges
the harassment to which public 153
need only be general in nature."
Perhaps the most remarkable portion of the Cole opinion was the
court's conclusion that a charge alleging that the school board had
retained an incompetent superintendent must also be dismissed as factually insufficient. The recall petition bolstered its allegations of incompetence with a list of actions such as the superintendent's
recommendation to use school funds to create a community center and
his decision to close a high school. 154 The court, however, viewed
these same allegations as demonstrating the superintendent's willingness and capacity to make difficult and controversial decisions:
This alone shows his competency to take independent action. A
superintendent cannot be expected to make decisions with which
everyone will agree. Such decisions require the use of judgment and
discretion. The use of such judgment does not as a matter of law
establish incompetency. Without allegations showing the superinboard cannot be subject to recall for
tendent's incompetency, the 155
retaining the superintendent.
By striking the allegation that the board had hired an incompetent
superintendent, the Washington Supreme Court overruled a long line
of previous decisions in which it had held that allegations suggesting a
public official had hired an incompetent subordinate provided suffi156
cient grounds for recall.
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
had erred in refusing to allow a voir dire examination of the recall
petitioners to determine their knowledge of the alleged facts supporting the recall petition. The court pointed out that Washington law
requires recall sponsors to verify their knowledge of the alleged facts
upon which the stated grounds for recall are based. 157 Furthermore,
Washington law requires the superior court to determine the sufficiency of recall charges.1 58 According to the court, the statute permits
a voir dire examination by the judge of the recall petitioners. This
a detailed description including the approximate date, location, and nature
of each act complained of, be signed by the person or persons making the
charge, give their respective post office addresses, and be verified under oath
that he or they believe the charge or charges to be true and have knowledge
of the alleged facts upon which the stated grounds for recall are based.
153. Cole, 103 Wash. 2d at - 692 P.2d at 803.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. See supra note 148.
157. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 29.82.010 (Supp. 1984).

158. Id. § 29.82.023.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:41

examination should be limited to questions about the recall sponsors'
knowledge of the charges contained in their recall petition and the
basis of that knowledge. The recall petitioners cannot be questioned
concerning the truth or falsity of recall charges since Washington law
the truth of the charges
specifically precludes a court from considering
159
when it is considering their sufficiency.
In the companion case of Chandler v. Otto, 160 the Washington
Supreme Court considered a recall petition to oust four city council
members who had voted to reject the two lowest bidders for a waste
disposal contract because of irregularities in the bid forms. The recall
their discretion and acting in
petition accused the officials of abusing
16 1
contravention of the public interest.
As in Cole v. Webster, the court in Chandler rejected the recall
petition as legally insufficient. In the court's words, "an elected official
cannot be recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted
him or her by law." 162 The city council had the authority to award
the waste disposal contract to "the lowest responsible bidder,"' 16 3 and
absent some allegation of fraud or "arbitrary, unreasonable misuse of
discretion,"' 164 the city council members could not be recalled for rejecting bids because of irregularities in the bid forms. "The petition
merely attacks the judgment of the councilmen," the court 1con66
cluded.' 6 5 "The exercise of judgment is not grounds for recall."'
Cole v. Webster, Chandler v. Otto, and the 1984 amendments to
Washington's recall statutes place reasonable and necessary restrictions on the recall process in Washington. It is now well established
that a Washington public officer may not be recalled for taking legitimate discretionary action that is politically unpopular. Moreover, the
recall sponsors must verify that they have knowledge of the facts upon
which recall charges are based. Thus, Washington public officials
have significant protection against recall drives instituted by individuals angered by the legitimate but unpopular decisions of elected
officials.
These developments, however, do not go far enough. While
courts certainly should be authorized to inquire about the recall petitioners' knowledge of the facts supporting recall charges, they should
159. Id.
160. 103 Wash. 2d 268, 693 P.2d 71 (1984).
161. The decision to reject the two lowest bidders due to irregularities in the bid
forms was alleged to have increased the cost of the contract by $180,000. Id. at 279,
693 P.2d at _.
162. Id. at 274, 693 P.2d at -.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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also be empowered to determine whether facts exist to establish a
prima facie case of the charges' truthfulness. Furthermore, as an
added protection against unwarranted recall drives, a person who
knowingly makes false recall charges should be subject to criminal
penalties.
The current state of Washington's recall law stands in stark contrast to the law of recall in Alaska after the Meiners decision. Meiners
is in accord with the status of Washington law before the recent developments in Washington. Thus, in Alaska, public officials remain subject to recall without significant protection against recall drives based
on false allegations or motivated by the desire to retaliate for valid yet
unpopular discretionary actions. The remainder of this article sets
forth a proposed legislative program designed to preserve the value of
the recall process while curbing potential abuses.
B.

A Legislative Proposal for Alaska

In Meiners, the Alaska Supreme Court suggested legislative reform of the recall statute, indicating that the controversy in Meiners
arose in part because Alaska's recall statute is ambiguous. 167 Judicial
intervention in the recall process could be decreased, the supreme
court stated, if the recall statute were drafted more carefully. 168
As the supreme court pointed out in Meiners, the parties most
intimately involved in the initiation of recall elections frequently lack
69
access to legal counsel, particularly in small, rural communities.1
Election officials evaluating recall petitions may be part-time municipal clerks who must make decisions without legal advice. Thus, recall
statutes should be simple, straightforward, and capable of interpretation and administration by laymen with a minimum of legal assistance
or judicial involvement.
A legislative proposal designed to reform Alaska's municipal recall law is set forth in the Appendix. The number of signatures required to satisfy the signature requirement is increased in this
proposal. Grounds for recall are narrowly defined to make it easier for
election officials to determine whether a recall petition states statutory
grounds for recall. Sanctions are imposed for placing false charges on
recall petitions, and public officials are given the right to challenge
recall petitions in court before the adequacy of signatures is determined. Key provisions of the proposal and the problems they are
1 70
designed to correct are discussed below.
167. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

168. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
169. 687 P.2d at 295-96.
170. In 1984, the Alaska House of Representatives passed House Bill 172, a comprehensive bill to reform Alaska's municipal code (Title 29 of Alaska statutes).
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1. Signature Requirement. Under present law, a municipal recall
election will be scheduled upon the filing of a valid recall petition containing signatures equaling fifteen percent of the votes cast in the last
election for the targeted office. 171 The figure is increased to twenty-five
percent for municipalities having less than 7,500 persons.1 72 Alaska
has one of the lowest signature requirements in the United States. In

rural communities, a tiny number of an official's constituents may
force a recall election. In Meiners, for example, only 198 signatures

were required to force a recall election for eleven school board members. 173 In the 1984 school board elections in the Matanuska-Susitna
School District, only twenty percent of the registered voters went to
the polls. Thus, the signatures of only three percent of the registered
voters in that school district would have been required to force a recall

election. 174
Proposed section 29.26.280 of the Alaska Code raises the signature requirement to twenty-five percent, and bases the percentage
upon the number of registered voters, not on the number of persons
who voted in the last election. The raised signature requirement

reduces the possibility that a public official will be vulnerable to recall
merely because of a low voter turnout in the targeted official's election.

2. Groundsfor Recall. In contrast to jurisdictions that allow voters to recall their officials at will, Alaska limits recall to the specified
grounds of misconduct in office, incompetence, or failure to perform
Alaska H. Res. 172, 13th Leg., 2d Sess., 1984. The bill passed the House of Representatives but failed to pass in the Senate. Chapter 26 of that bill contains proposed
recall legislation. House Bill 172 contains no major changes in the recall statute,
although the signature requirement on recall petitions was raised to twenty-five percent of the number of votes cast in the last municipal election, regardless of the population of the municipality. In addition, the bill provided for election officials to review
recall petitions prior to their circulation for signatures.
The author's legislative proposal in the Appendix adopts some of the procedural
statutes contained in House Bill 172, many of which are virtually identical to present
recall law. The Appendix also adopts the numbering of House Bill 172. Nevertheless,
the Appendix goes much further toward curbing abuses in the recall process. For
example, sanctions for false allegations in recall petitions and a provision authorizing
judicial review of the actions of election officials regarding recall are contained in the
author's legislative proposal, but are not contained in House Bill 172. References in
the text to proposed statutes are to the author's proposal, not to House Bill 172.
171. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.070(b)(2) (1984); id. § 29.28.150(a)(1).
172. Id. § 29.28.070(b)(1).
173. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 292.
174. The preliminary tally of votes cast in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough School
Board election on October 2, 1984, showed between 3,200 and 3,560 votes cast; however, there are 17,792 registered voters in the district. Under present law, only 534
votes are necessary for a successful recall of a Matanuska-Susitna Borough School
Board member. This figure is three percent of the registered voters in that school
district. Anchorage Daily News, October 4, 1984, § C at 3.
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prescribed duties. 175 Unfortunately, the statutes do not further define
Alaska's grounds for recall. Various election officials must decide
whether particular charges set forth in a recall petition fall within one
of the statutory categories. Proposed section 29.26.250(a) of the
Alaska Code narrowly defines the grounds for recall. "Misconduct in
office" is defined as an unlawful act wilfully committed by an elected
public official. "Incompetence" means mental or physical incapacity
of an official to perform the duties of office during a period of at least
sixty days. "Failure to perform prescribed duties" means wilful neglect or failure by an official to perform faithfully a duty imposed by
law. 176
In addition, proposed section 29.26.250(b) of the Alaska Code
makes clear that lawful discretionary acts may not form the basis for
recall of a public official. This provision is in harmony with Cole v.
Webster, in which the Washington Supreme Court held that a school
board's decision to close several public schools was a discretionary177act
which did not furnish grounds for recall under Washington law.
These definitions are designed to assist local election officials who
must decide whether a recall petition describes statutory grounds for
recall. The proposed definitions make it easier for an official to determine whether a charge that a public official failed to perform prescribed duties is legally sufficient, because prescribed duties are defined
to mean duties imposed by statute. By the same token, a charge that a
public official committed misconduct in office can be more easily evaluated since misconduct in office is defined to mean the wilful commission of an unlawful act.
3. Truth or Falsity of Recall Allegations. Because courts in most
jurisdictions refuse to determine the truth or falsity of recall allegations, recall proponents are not held accountable for the statements
they circulate in recall petitions. Two elements of the proposed statutes deal with this problem. First, proposed section 29.26.260 of the
Alaska Code requires recall sponsors to identify themselves and to certify under penalty of perjury their belief in the truth of the charges set
forth in an application for a recall petition. Knowingly submitting a
false statement in an application for a recall petition would be punishable as a Class A misdemeanor.
Second, proposed section 29.26.370 of the Alaska Code gives the
superior court jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency and specificity
175. ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.140 (1984).
176. Definitions for misconduct in office and failure to perform prescribed duties
are modeled after those proposed for Washington in Cohen, supra note 118, at 44, and
after the statutory grounds contained in WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (Supp.
1984).
177. 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984).
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of recall charges, as well as the existence of facts sufficient to support a
prima facie case of the charges' truthfulness.17 8 The public official opposing a recall petition would have the burden of proving the falsity of
recall charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the official would be required to bring an action in superior court no later
than twenty days after he receives a copy of the statement of grounds
for recall from the municipal clerk. Thus, judicial review of a challenged recall petition would take place early in the recall proceedings
rather than at the conclusion of the signature-gathering process.' 79
These two statutes, if passed by the legislature, would reduce the
likelihood of a recall based on false charges. A heavy responsibility
would be placed on recall sponsors to stand behind their allegations.
A public official would be allowed to dispute these allegations in the
superior court. Yet, the public official would have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the recall charges were false; thus,
recall proponents would not be unduly burdened by judicial intervention in the recall process.
4. Opportunityfor and Timing of Response by Targeted Officials.
Alaska's existing recall system contains several provisions which unfairly hinder the targeted officials' attempts to respond to and defend
against recall efforts. First, although recall allegations may be any
length and must be reproduced verbatim on a recall ballot, rebuttal
statements by targeted officials are limited to two hundred words. Second, while recall proponents have the opportunity to circulate allegations against a public official on the recall petition itself, the public
official's rebuttal is seen by the voters for the first time on the recall
ballot.
Under proposed section 29.26.270 of the Alaska Code, both recall
allegations and rebuttals would be limited to two hundred words. Additionally, the public official would have the opportunity to place his
rebuttal statement on the recall petition itself. This would allow vot178. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.720 (1982) (authorizing judicial review of decisions by the Director of the Alaska Division of Elections regarding efflorts to recall
state officials); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.023 (Supp. 1984) (authorizing the superior court to determine the sufficiency of recall charges); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 29.82.160 (Supp. 1984) (giving the superior court original jurisdiction
pertaining to recall matters). Washington law prohibits the courts from determining
the truth or falsity of recall charges. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.82.023 (Supp.
1984).
179. This proposal is modeled after that of Cohen, supra note 118, at 48-51. Washington Supreme Court Justice Utter also suggested that the Washington legislature
pass legislation permitting the courts to determine the truth or falsity of recall
charges. Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 839-40, 505 P.2d 814, 819 (1973) (Utter,
J., concurring).
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ers to read both the recall charges and the public official's rebuttal
statement prior to signing a recall petition.
Under the current Alaska recall statute, election officials do not
examine the sufficiency of a recall petition until after the signatures are
gathered. If some of the allegations are insufficient, they are deleted
and the balance of the petition is placed on the ballot. If the entire
petition is inadequate, the whole petition is rejected and the recall proponents must start the process of gathering signatures again, with no
assurance that the new petition will be found statutorily sufficient.
This procedure places undue burdens on both the elected official and
the recall proponents.
The proposed section 29.26.270 of the Alaska Code would give a
municipal clerk the opportunity to examine recall allegations before
the signature-gathering process begins. Statutory defects could be corrected and the targeted official could challenge factual allegations in
court before the petition is submitted to the voting public.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Recall is firmly embedded in the American political process, particularly in the West. In some jurisdictions officials may be recalled
for almost any reason. In other jurisdictions, including Alaska, an official may only be recalled for grounds specified by statute. In most
jurisdictions, however, courts are reluctant to rule on the truth or falsity of recall allegations, preferring to let the voters make this decision
in a recall election.
In Meiners, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the municipal
recall statute should be liberally construed to permit the voters to express their will. 180 The court's position is that the voters, not the election officials, should decide the truth of recall charges, 181 and that
"artificial technical hurdles" should not hinder the scheduling of recall
elections. 182 In short, the Alaska Supreme Court has expressed a
strong reluctance for the judiciary to involve itself in the recall
process.
Because of the court's reluctance to entertain challenges to recall
efforts, the recall process is subject to abuse. Officials may be recalled
based on false allegations with no recourse to the courts. Recall sponsors may try to remove an official from office for political reasons having nothing to do with the statutory grounds for recall, and the
process may inhibit officials from making legitimate but unpopular decisions on public questions.
180. Meiners, 687 P.2d at 296.
181. Id. at 300 n.18.
182. Id. at 296.
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The proposed amendments require recall sponsors to be responsible for the truth of recall charges. Charges must be made under penalty of perjury, and knowing submission of false recall allegations is
punishable as a misdemeanor. If an election is scheduled based on
false charges or insufficient grounds, the public official may petition
the superior court for relief. The signature requirement for recall petitions is raised in order to prevent a tiny minority from forcing public
officials and government bodies to spend public and private funds on
mid-term elections. Finally, the grounds of recall are defined to exclude recall for legitimate discretionary acts and to make it easier for
election officials to determine whether recall petitions state statutory
grounds for recall.
If this proposal were accepted by the Alaska legislature, the positive aspects of recall would be preserved. Voters would still have a
reasonable opportunity to recall elected officials who are charged with
misconduct. At the same time, abuses in the recall process would be
curbed so that public officials would not be ousted from office for making legitimate but unpopular decisions.
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
ARTICLE 3.

RECALL

Sec. 29.26.240. RECALL. An official who is elected or appointed to an elective municipal office may be recalled by the voters
after the official has served the first 120 days of the term for which
elected or appointed.
Sec. 29.26.250. GROUNDS FOR RECALL. (a) Grounds for recall are misconduct in office, incompetence, or failure to perform prescribed duties during the term of office which the official is presently
serving:
(1) misconduct in office means an unlawful act committed
wilfully by any elected public official;
(2) incompetence means mental or physical incapacity of
an official to perform the duties of office for a period of no
less than sixty days;
(3) failure to perform prescribed duties means the wilful
neglect or failure by an official to perform faithfully a duty
imposed by statute.
(b) Performance of a lawful discretionary act does not form the
basis for recall of an official.
Sec. 29.26.260. APPLICATION FOR RECALL PETITION. (a) An
application for a recall petition shall be filed with the municipal clerk
and shall contain:
(1) the signatures and resident addresses of at least 10 municipal voters who will sponsor the petition;
(2) the address to which all correspondence relating to the
petition may be sent;
(3) a statement in 200 words or less of the grounds of the
recall stated with particularity.
(b) An additional sponsor may be added at any time before the
petition is filed by submitting the name of the sponsor to the clerk.
(c) Each sponsor of an application for a recall petition shall certify under penalty of perjury that the sponsor believes the charges set
forth in the application for the recall petition are true. Knowingly
submitting a false statement in an application for a recall petition shall
be punishable as a Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 29.26.270. RECALL PETITION. (a) If the municipal clerk
determines that an application for recall petition meets the require183. The Appendix sets out the author's legislative proposal. Although a small
portion of the language is taken from Alaska's current recall statutes, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 29.28.130-.250 (1984), the majority of the language is not part of Alaska law. See
supra note 170 for further explanation.
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ments of A.S. 29.26.250 and A.S. 29.26.260, the clerk shall send, by
certified mail, a copy of the application for recall petition to the official
sought to be recalled along with a notice informing the official that the
official may submit to the clerk a rebuttal statement of 200 words or
less no later than 10 days after receipt of the petition's statement of
grounds.
(b) When the time period for submitting a rebuttal statement by
the official has passed, the municipal clerk shall prepare a recall petition. All copies of the petition shall contain:
(1) the name of the official sought to be recalled;
(2) the statement of the grounds for recall as set out in the
application for petition;
(3) the official's rebuttal statement if one was submitted in
accordance with subsection (a);
(4) the date the petition is issued by the clerk;
(5) notice that signatures must be secured within 60 days
after the date the petition is issued;
(6) spaces for each signature, the printed name of each
signer, the date of each signature, and the residence and
mailing addresses of each signer;
(7) a statement, with space for the sponsor's sworn signature and date of signing, that the sponsor personally circulated the petition, that all signatures were affixed in the
presence of the sponsor, and that the sponsor believes the
signatures to be those of the persons whose names they purport to be; and
(8) space for indicating the number of signatures on the
petition.
(c) Copies of the petition shall be provided to each sponsor by
the clerk.
Sec. 29.26.280. SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS. (a) The signatures on a recall petition shall be secured within 60 days after the date
the clerk issues the petition. The statement provided under A.S.
29.26.270(b)(7) shall be completed and signed by the sponsor. Signatures shall be in ink or indelible pencil.
(b) The clerk shall determine the number of signatures required
on a petition and inform each sponsor. If a petition seeks to recall an
official who represents the municipality at large, the petition shall be
signed by a number of voters equal to 25 percent of the registered
voters in the municipality. If a petition seeks to recall an official who
represents a district, the petition shall be signed by a number of the
voters residing in the district equal to 25 percent of the registered voters in the district.
(c) Illegible signatures shall be rejected by the clerk unless ac-
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companied by a legible printed name. Signatures not accompanied by
a legible residence address shall be rejected.
(d) A petition signer may withdraw his signature upon written
application to the clerk before certification of the petition.

Sec. 29.26.290.

SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION.

(a) The copies of a

recall petition shall be assembled and filed as a single instrument. A
petition may not be filed within 180 days before the end of the term of
office of the official sought to be recalled. Within 10 days after the
date a petition is filed, the municipal clerk shall:
(1) certify on the petition whether it is sufficient; and
(2) if the petition is insufficient, identify the insufficiency
and notify the sponsors at the address provided under A.S.
29.26.260(a) by certified mail.
(b) A petition that is insufficient may be supplemented with additional signatures obtained and filed within 10 days after the date on
which the petition is rejected if:
(1) the petition contains an adequate number of signatures,
counting both valid and invalid signatures; and
(2) the supplementary petition is filed more than 180 days
before the end of the term of office of the official sought to be
recalled.
(c) A petition that is insufficient shall be rejected and filed as a
public record unless it is supplemented under (b) of this section.
Within 10 days after the supplementary filing the clerk shall re-certify
the petition. If it is still insufficient, the petition is rejected and filed as
a public record.

See. 29.26.300.

NEw

RECALL PETITION APPLICATION.

A

new application for a petition to recall the same official may not be
filed sooner than six months after a petition is rejected as insufficient.

See. 29.26.310.

SUBMISSION.

If a recall petition is sufficient,

the clerk shall submit it to the governing body at the next regular
meeting or at a special meeting held before the next regular meeting.

See. 29.26.320.

ELECTION.

(a) If a regular election occurs

within 75 days, but not sooner than 45 days, after submission of the
petition to the governing body, the governing body shall submit the
recall at that election.
(b) If no regular election occurs within 75 days, the governing
body shall hold a special election on a recall question within 75 days
but not sooner than 45 days after a petition is submitted to the governing body.
(c) If a vacancy occurs in the office after a sufficient recall petition is filed with the clerk, the recall question may not be submitted to
the voters. The governing body may not appoint to the same office an
official who resigns after a sufficient recall petition is filed naming him.
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Sec. 29.26.330. FORM OF RECALL BALLOTS. A recall ballot
shall contain:
(1) the grounds of recall as stated in 200 words or less on
the recall petition;
(2) a rebuttal statement by the official named on the recall
petition of 200 words or less, if the statement is filed in accordance with A.S. 29.26.270(a);
(3) the following question: "Shall (name of person) be recalled from the office of (office)? Yes [ ]
No [ ]."
Sec. 29.26.340. EFFECT. (a) If a majority vote favors recall,
the office becomes vacant upon certification of the recall election.
(b) If an official is not recalled at the election, an application for
a petition to recall the same official may not be filed sooner than six
months after the election.
Sec. 29.26.350. ELECTION OF SUCCESSOR. (a) If the voters recall an official other than a school board member, the clerk shall conduct an election for a successor to fill the unexpired term. The
election shall be held at least 10 but not more than 45 days from the
date of the certification of the recall election. However, if a regular or
special election occurs within 75 days after certification of the recall
election, the successor to the recalled official shall be chosen at that
regular or special election. The procedures and requirements for the
regular election for the office from which the incumbent is recalled
apply to the election conducted under this section.
(b) If a member of the school board is recalled, the office of that
member is filled in accordance with A.S. 14.12.070. If all members are
recalled from a school board, the governor shall appoint three qualified persons to the school board. The appointees shall appoint additional members to fill remaining vacancies in accordance with A.S.
14.12.070. A person appointed under this subsection serves until a
successor is elected and takes office.
(c) Nominations for a successor may be filed until seven days
before the last date on which a first notice of the election must be
given. Nominations may not be filed before the certification of the
recall election.

Sec. 29.26.360.

APPLICATION.

A.S. 29.26.240-A.S. 29.26.360

apply to home rule and general law municipalities.

Sec. 29.26.370.

JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

(a) Any

person aggrieved by the filing of recall charges, or by the failure of an
election official to perform duties in relation to the recall, may file an
action in the Superior Court. On hearing such action, the Superior
Court shall have jurisdiction to consider the following matters:
(1) the sufficiency or specificity of such recall charge or
charges;
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(2) the issuance of an injunction to compel performance of
any act required of the municipal clerk or other elected official in relation to recall, or to prevent the performance of an
act by the municipal clerk or other elected official in relation
to recall;
(3) the existence or lack of facts establishing prima facie
the truthfulness of such recall charges; provided that any
person challenging any such recall charge pursuant to this
subsection shall have the burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence.
(b) Any action pursuant to subsections (1) and (3) of this statute
shall be commenced no later than 15 days from the date that the officer sought to be recalled received a copy of the statement of grounds
for recall from the municipal clerk pursuant to A.S. 29.26.270(a).
Any action pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be commenced within 15 days from the time the complaint arises.

